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1 Introduction
Districting plays a crucial role in all electoral systems endowed with single member
districts. The underlying problem is that an actual redistricting, which has to be carried
out in order to prevent malapportionment (i.e. unequal representation of citizens),
may favor a specific party. The resulting bias could be caused by an ex ante unbiased
districting procedure (where by ex ante unbiasedness we mean that the bias and its
extent towards a party is not known prior to the employment of the given districting
procedure) or consciously by the body in charge of the redistricting process. The latter
goes back to 1812 when Elbrige Gerry Governor of Massachusetts reluctantly signed a
redistricting plan favoring Jeffersonian democrats into law. The word gerrymandering,
standing for the activity of carrying out a redistricting in favor of a certain party, was
coined from Gerry’s name and the salamander like looking districts of Massachusetts
in 1812. Since then gerrymandering is a hot issue in the United States and is still
happening because in most US states the legislature has primary responsibility for
creating a redistricting plan, often subject to approval by the state governor.1 Other
countries, like Hungary, have not carried out a redistricting at all because the parties
fear that they may be harmed by the new districting. Of course, lack of redistricting
over a long time leads to huge inequalities in district sizes.
The paper focuses on the computer science, the economics and the political sci-
ence literature; and thus, it does not present the large literature on legal issues and
court cases. Originally, it was hoped in the mid of the 20th century that through the
use of modern computers the problem of gerrymandering could be overcome since a
computer program just using data on voters distributions without any statistical in-
formation on voters preferences should not be biased towards a party (e.g. Vickrey,
1961). Not surprisingly this view was too optimistic because a computer programmer
may write a program favoring a party in a disguised form and because there are no
precise measures of ex ante unbiasedness. Even if there is a good measure for ex ante
unbiasedness, parties should fear ex post bias. For more on the effects of the increasing
role played by computers in determining districting plans from a historical perspective
consult Altman (2005). The economics literature tries to determine party strategies,
the effects of gerrymandering on government policy and social welfare. For instance,
one may pose the question whether gerrymandering is harmful at all from an econom-
ical point of view. Though there is no clear borderline between the economics and the
political science literature, the latter is more interested, for example, in the effects of
redistricting on the emerging party structure, on voters’ behavior (participation rate),
on the competitiveness of districts and on the rights of minorities.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a sur-
vey of the computational literature in which determining ex ante unbiased districtings
and the computational complexity of the districting problem are considered. Section 3
deals with the social science literature on districting. Section 4 offers some concluding
remarks.
1For more details on redistricting practice, also outside the US, see e.g.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Redistricting (accessed: 11/10/2009).
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2 The computational approach to districting
A solution of the political districting problem partitions the state into territorial units
(districts). Ex ante unbiased districtings usually require the following conditions to be
satisfied by a districting.
• Population equality requires that the populations of the districts should be as
equal as possible. This is a strong condition in the US, where only small district
size deviations are tolerated by court, whereas in many European countries larger
deviations (for instance, a 15% deviation in population from the average district
population) are allowed.
• Contiguity means that a district cannot be disconnected; that is, any two points
within the district can be connected through a path remaining in that district.
• Compactness prescribes that the shapes of the districts should not be to long and
thin. Thus, rectangular and circular districts should be preferred.
Since the above three criteria are independent of the voters’ party preferences it is
widely believed that an algorithm meeting these three criteria is in some sense unbi-
ased. While population equality is a precise condition, contiguity and compactness are
ambiguous.2 In fact, the Supreme Court always rejected appeals claiming unlawful
gerrymandering based on loosely connected or oddly looking districts, since it could
be the case that population equality and minority rights did not allow for a more con-
tiguous and more compact districting. However, most of the computational literature
focused on algorithms finding ex ante unbiased solutions.
2.1 Early algorithms determining ex ante unbiased districtings
Vickrey (1961) pointed out by example that reasonable districtings could produce com-
pletely different outcomes in the number of winning districts. Therefore, he propagated
that the human element should be removed from the process and random elements
should be integrated into a procedure so that the actual districting plan cannot be pre-
dicted. Informally, he sketched a procedure not guaranteeing a contiguous and compact
districting. The main purpose of his paper was to show that mechanical rules without
human influence could solve the political districting problem. However, his proposal
was quite rudimentary and impractical for real life problems.
Hess et al. (1965) developed an ex ante unbiased method to solve the legislative
districting problem of Delaware by observing that the political districting problem is
analogous to the so-called ‘warehouse-location’ problem. The legislative districts (LD)
were constructed from inseparable smaller units called enumeration districts (ED).
Their procedure (1) needed a heuristic guess for the initial district centers, (2) a trans-
portation algorithm was used to assign EDs population equally to district centers, (3)
an adjustment procedure ensured that each ED was contained entirely in one LD, (4)
new district centers were determined from the obtained LDs, (5) go to step 2 if the
change of district centers is too large. The main shortcomings of their procedure were
2For recent advancements on measuring district compactness see Fryer and Holden (2007) and
Chambers and Miller (2009).
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that its result depended on the initial guess of district centers and that its conver-
gence was not proven. However, one of their redistricting plans was used for legislative
redistricting in Delaware.
Kagel’s (1966) procedure obtained a districting as a solution of a weighted opti-
mization problem, which simultaneously strives for population equality and for district
‘compactness’. His procedure starts from an initial districting (actual districting) and
sequentially tries to improve the object function by checking moves of an ED from its
current LD to another neighboring LD and by checking bilateral exchanges of EDs be-
tween two LDs. The main shortcomings of his procedure are that it might be trapped
in a local optimum and that it depends very much on the initial districting.
Garfinkel and Nemhauser (1970) provided the first algorithm finding all ex ante
unbiased districtings. Therefore, a more detailed description of their algorithm is given
here. M districts have to be formed from N given population units with respective
populations p1, . . . , pN . Let p =
∑N
i=1 pi/M be the mean population. The elements of
a zero-one matrix A = (aij)
N,M
i=1,j=1 indicate whether population unit i is assigned to
district j. Hence, the population of district j equals P (j) =
∑N
i=1 aijpi. Population
equality is captured by condition
cj = |P (j)− p| ≤ αp, (2.1)
where α ∈ [0, 1] is the maximum relative deviation of district population from the
average district population. An adjacency matrix B = (bij)
N,N
i=1,j=1 indicates whether
two population units have a common boundary. A solution satisfies contiguity if the
resulting districts are connected in the graph given by the adjacency matrix B. The
compactness of district j is determined by c′j = d2j/A(j), where dj equals the largest
distance between to population units within district j and A(j) denotes the area of
district j. An upper bound on district compactness is given by parameter β. The
zero-one matrix A specifies a feasible districting if it satisfies the population equality
constraints (2.1), its associated graph is connected and satisfies the connectedness
condition. The objective is to determine the feasible districtings having the smallest
maximum population inequality (minmax cj). The algorithm determines in the first
phase the set of all feasible districts and in the second the optimal districtings. The
employed enumeration technique ensures that the algorithm finds a solution if the set
of feasible districtings is non-empty. However, the required number of computations
explodes as N increases. Clearly, having smaller population units produces better
districtings, but increases the number of computations.
2.2 The computational complexity of districting problems
Nagel (1972) already pointed out in an early survey that automated redistricting has
its computational limitations by considering the available programs of his time. Hence,
one could only speak about computer aided redistricting in which the computer merely
serves as a tabulating device.
The computational complexity of determining an ex ante unbiased districting was
identified by Altman (1997). In particular, he established that meeting the three basic
criteria of ex ante unbiasedness is an NP-hard problem. In addition, he demonstrated
that maximizing the number of competitive districts is also NP-hard.
Nagel (1972) had already mentioned that a party with an overall support of 40%
should receive, for instance, at least 15% of seats. Hence, ex ante unbiasedness is
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not really a good criterion for a satisfactory algorithm. Recently, Puppe and Tasnádi
(2008) showed that achieving ex post unbiasedness, which requires that the number of
winning districts of a party should be up to integer rounding proportional to its share
in votes, is an NP-complete problem. Puppe and Tasnádi (2009) established in a follow
up work that determining an optimal gerrymandering is also NP-complete.
2.3 Recent districting algorithms
The computational complexity of the political districting problems led to alternative
approaches to determine ex ante unbiased districtings. A short and non-complete list
of contributions follows.
Bação et al. (2005) employed genetic algorithms in which the encoding consists of
a string of geographic information of districts and the fitness function follows from the
criteria of ex ante unbiasedness. They also determined a districting of Lisbon city in
Portugal. Chou and Li (2006) applied the q-state Potts model of statistical physics
by which they determined the legislative districts for Taipei city in Taiwan. Various
heuristics have been introduced by Mehrotra et al. (1998), Bozkaya et al. (2003), Ricca
and Simeone (2008) and Ricca et al. (2008).
3 The social science literature on districting
This section contains many interesting contributions to the political districting problem
appearing in the economics and the political science literature. Since the social science
literature on political districting is very large, only a selective survey of empirical and
theoretical works follows.
Owen and Grofman (1988) determined the optimal gerrymandering for a risk-averse
party controlling the redistricting process in a two-party system with only single-
member districts in an uncertain world. The optimal solution has the characteristic
that the gerrymanderer creates on the one side districts with equal and comforting
winning probabilities and on the other side districts full with its opponent supporters;
therefore, this solution is called bimodal by many others.
Gelman and King (1994) surprisingly found that redistricting increases the elec-
toral responsiveness (that is, how legislative composition reacts to voters’ preferences).
Another less surprising but important result of their paper is that redistricting, no
matter how biased it is, is better than having no redistricting at all. They obtained
these results through a regression model using US election results from 1968 to 1988
containing 267 statewide elections and 29,679 district-level elections.
Sherstyuk (1998) combined the cake-cutting literature with the optimal gerryman-
dering problem. As Owen and Grofman (1988) she assumed that a party is in control of
the redistricting process but she takes geographical constraints into consideration and
allows for more general distributions of voters’ characteristics. She identifies objective
functions and conditions under which the optimal gerrymandering solution remains
bimodal. It should be mentioned that her results are non-constructive because they
rely on Lyapunov’s existence theorem. District compactness does not appear in her
geographical conditions and contiguity is achieved through arbitrarily thin paths.
Gilligan and Matsusaka (1999) investigates partisan bias empirically and theoret-
ically in function of the number of voters and the number of single-member districts.
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They find that within a jurisdiction an increase in population increases partisan bias,
while an increase in districts decreases partisan bias under optimal gerrymandering.
Hence, an increase in the overall population should be followed by an increase in the
number of seats since otherwise partisan bias would inevitably increase. Their findings
were tested on data from U.S. elections over the period 1950-1994. In another paper
Gilligan and Matsusaka (2006) develops a simple theory of redistricting based on the
median voter theorem. The policy outcome in their model is determined by the median
legislator, which should equal the policy choice of the median voter in the absence of
bias. Since the legislators are in fact the median voters of their own districts, the me-
dian legislator usually does not equal the median voter in case of partisan districting.
One of their main finding is that the resulting policy bias favors non-majority groups.
Another interesting result is that random districting does not eliminate policy bias on
average.
Shotts (2002) develops a three-stage game-theoretic model in which, first, redis-
tricting is carried out in each state by a gerrymanderer, second, the voters determine
the composition of the House of Representatives, and third, the policy choice is made.
The main point is that since racial gerrymandering is unlawful and liberal voters (left-
ist) are more susceptible to racial gerrymandering, conservative gerrymanderers are
more constrained than liberal gerrymanderers. Therefore, the final policy outcome is
biased towards liberals contrary to what many political scientists believe. In an earlier
paper Shotts (2001) focuses on the partisan instead of the policy effect of mandatory
majority-minority districts (in which statewide minorities have a majority).
The seat-vote curve describes the relationship between the relative share in seats
and the relative share in votes. In case of a proportional representation system the
seat vote curve is linear. Two important measures related to seat-vote curves are bias
and responsiveness: The former one measures the difference of the realized seat share
of a party from its proportional seat share based on its vote share, while the latter
measures the marginal effect of a change in a party’s share of votes on its seat share.
Coate and Knight (2007) characterize the socially optimal seat-vote curve and shows
the existence of a districting producing an optimal seat-vote curve. They also develop a
methodology for computing real-life seat-vote curves and consider welfare gains arising
from an optimal districting. Their paper assumes that a districting authority tries to
maximize social welfare in an environment of two parties (Democrats and Republicans)
and of three categories of voters (Democrats, Republicans and Independents) whose
ideological stance can be measured by a value between zero (ardent Democrat) and
one (ardent Republican). The payoff of a citizen having ideology x ∈ [0, 1] is given by
β − γ(x− x′)2, where x′ is the ideology of its legislation, β is its payoff if its ideology
is fully matched by the legislation’s ideology and γ is a dissipation factor. The state
has to be divided into n equal districts without geographical constraints and a given
districting determines social welfare by aggregating the payoffs of the individuals. As a
result they obtained a linear optimal seat-vote curve with bias towards the party having
the larger partisan base and responsiveness depending on swing voters (Independents).
Since the socially optimal districting has been derived without considering only feasible
districtings,3 Coate and Knight also give a condition for the implementability of the
obtained socially optimal linear seat-vote curve.
From Coate and Knight (2007) independently Besley and Preston (2007) gave a
3Here feasibility does not mean geographic feasibility, but the sustainability of a technical assump-
tion simplifying the derivation of the socially optimal seat-vote curve.
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similar micro foundation of seat-vote curves to determine how electoral districting
effects policy choice. They obtain that more electoral bias leads to more extreme
policy choices. In an empirical part they employ their model to local governments in
England.
Chambers (2008) developed an axiomatic theory of political representation in which
he examined the possibility of a gerrymandering-proof voting rule. In the first stage
voters elect an alternative in each district by a non-specified voting rule and in the
second stage the districts’ outcomes are aggregated by the same voting rule to a na-
tionwide outcome. Allowing that n voters can be partitioned into k districts without
any kind of district size or geographical constraints, a gerrymandering-proof rule is
either a pathological one (selects always the same alternative out of two) or has to
allow for a set of countably infinite outcomes. Coming closer to the election of the
House of Representatives by allowing only two alternatives to vote for and admitting
any possible winning percentage of a party, under some technical conditions only quasi-
proportional rules (defined through so-called quasi-arithmetic means4) constitutes the
set of gerrymandering-proof rules. Chambers (2009) establishes that under some nat-
ural technical conditions a voting rule is consistent if and only if it is a partial priority
rule, where consistency means that the final outcome is independent of the employed
partitioning of voters and a partial priority rule allows each voter to veto certain alter-
natives. To obtain the result one can restrict itself to equally sized districts. However,
even Chamber’s second paper does not impose any kind of geographical constraints.
Friedman and Holden (2008) consider the case in which one of the two parties in
charge of the districting process faces a noisy signal of voter preferences. A finite
number of equally sized districts have to be formed without geographical constraints.
Voter’s preferences are measured on a one-dimensional scale, where the most right-
wing voter and the most left-wing voter are at the two ends. Thus, the paper can make
suggestions on how a gerrymanderer should handle less or more loyal party voters in
determining an optimal gerrymander. For instance, it has been shown that it does not
payoff to concentrate one’s most ardent opponents into the same district. Based on this
result they conclude that partisan gerrymandering implies also racial gerrymandering,
which is strictly forbidden by law, since major parts of African-Americans are ardent
supporters of Democrats.
Gul and Pesendorfer (2010) analyze a game in which two parties carry out the re-
districting within the territories under their legislative control and voters’ types are
unknown at the time of drawing the new district lines. Both parties try to maximize
the probability of getting a majority in the House of Representatives. Assuming a con-
tinuum of voters and a continuum of districts they find, among many other interesting
results, that both parties maximally segregate voters of unfavorable types, which is in
line with common wisdom.
4 Conclusion
Large parts of the computational literature focused on determining ex ante unbiased
districtings, which were determined by algorithms not using data on voters preferences.
Because of the computational complexity of the problem there is on going research for





, where g : [0, 1]→ R has
to be a continuous, strictly increasing function.
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finding new and faster algorithms. All of the presented algorithms have been applied
to real life districting problems and some of these results were used to solve actual
districting problems. Ex ante unbiasedness is not an acceptable solution for parties
since any given solution probably favors one of the parties. This might be one of the
reasons why these algorithms have not been used widely. Clearly, neither parties nor
independent juries are too happy about a random like distribution of seats. Though
there are many computer programs searching for the optimal gerrymandering, the
computer science literature has devoted less space to these algorithms probably because
they do not solve the gerrymandering problem.
The social science literature escapes the computational complexity of the district-
ing problem by considering simplified settings for which an optimal solution can be
determined. Based on these ‘toy’ models social scientists try to address qualitative
questions like:
• What are the key features of an optimal gerrymander?
• How does gerrymandering effect policy choice, minorities and social welfare?
Though some of the answers to these questions could be empirically validated, it is not
clear if neglecting geographical constraints like planarity, connectedness and contigu-
ity, does not destroy some of the qualitative answers completely. May be models of
bounded rationality could reduce the gap between the computational and social science
literature.
References
[1] M. Altman, Is Automation the Answer? The Computational Complexity of Auto-
mated Redistricting. Rutgers Computer and Law Technology Journal 23(1) 81-142
(1997).
[2] M. Altman, K. Mac Donald, and M.P. McDonald, From Crayons to Computers:
The Evolution of Computer Use in Redistricting. Social Science Computer Review
23(3) 334-346 (2005).
[3] F. Bação, V. Lobo and M. Painho, Applying Genetic Algorithms to zone Design.
Soft Computing 9(5) 341-348 (2005).
[4] T. Besley and I. Preston, Electoral Bias and Public Choice: Theory and Evidence.
Quarterly Journal of Economics 122(4) 1473-1510 (2007).
[5] B. Bozkaya, E. Erkut and G. Laporte, A Tabu Search Heuristic and Adaptive
Memory Procedure for Political Districting. European Journal of Operational Re-
search 144(1) 12-26 (2003).
[6] P.C. Chambers, Consistent Representative Democracy. Games and Economic Be-
havior 62(2), 348-363 (2008).
[7] P.C. Chambers, An Axiomatic Theory of Political Representation. Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, 144(1), 375-389 (2009).
[8] P.C. Chambers and A.D. Miller, A Measure of Bizarreness. Quarterly Journal of
Political Science forthcoming (2009).
7
[9] C-I. Chou and S.P. Li, Taming the Gerrymander–Statistical Physics Approach to
Political Districting Problem. Physica A 369(2) 799-808 (2006).
[10] S. Coate and B. Knight, Socially Optimal Districting: A Theoretical and Empirical
Exploration. Quarterly Journal of Economics 122(4) 1409-1471 (2007).
[11] J.N. Friedman and R.T. Holden, Optimal Gerrymandering: Sometimes Pack, But
Never Crack. American Economic Review 98(1) 113-144 (2008).
[12] R.G. Fryer and R.T. Holden, Measuring the Compactness of Political Districting
Plans. Mimeographed (2007).
[13] R.S. Garfinkel and G.L. Nemhauser, Optimal Political Districting by Implicit Enu-
meration Techniques. Management Science 16(8) 495-508 (1970).
[14] A. Gelman and G. King, Enhancing Democracy through Legislative Redistricting.
American Political Science Review 88(3) 541-559 (1994).
[15] T.W. Gilligan and J.G. Matsusaka, Structural Constraints on Partisan Bias under
the Efficient Gerrymander. Public Choice 100(1-2) 65-84 (1999).
[16] T.W. Gilligan and J.G. Matsusaka, Public Choice Principles of Redistricting. Pub-
lic Choice 129(3-4) 381-398 (2006).
[17] R. Gul and W. Pesendorfer, Strategic Redistricting. American Economic Review
forthcoming (2010).
[18] S.W. Hess, J.B Weaver, H.J. Siegfeldt, J.N. Whelan and P.A. Zitlau, Nonpartisan
Political Redistricting by Computer. Operations Research 13(6) 998-1006 (1965).
[19] H.F. Kaiser, An Objective Method for Establishing Legislative Districts. Midwest
Journal of Political Science 10(2) 200-213 (1966).
[20] A. Mehrotra, E.L. Johnson and G.L. Nemhauser, An Optimization Based Heuristic
for Political Districting. Management Science 44(8) 1100-1114 (1998).
[21] S.S. Nagel, Computers & the Law & Politics of Redistricting. Polity 5(1) 77-93
(1972).
[22] G. Owen and B. Grofman, Optimal Partisan Gerrymandering. Political Geography
Quarterly 7(1), 5-22 (1988).
[23] C. Puppe and A. Tasnádi, A Computational Approach to Districting. Mathemat-
ical Computer Modelling 48(9-10), 1455-1460 (2008).
[24] C. Puppe and A. Tasnádi, Optimal redistricting under geographical constraints:
Why “pack and crack” does not work. Economics Letters 105(1), 93-96 (2009).
[25] F. Ricca and B. Simeone, Local Search Algorithms for Political Districting. Po-
litical Districting. European Journal of Operational Research 189(3) 1409-1426
(2008).
[26] F. Ricca, A. Scozzari and B. Simeone, Weighted Vornoi Region Algorithms for
Political Districting. Mathematical Computer Modelling forthcoming (2008).
8
[27] K. Sherstyuk, How to Gerrymander: A Formal Analysis. Public Choice 95(1-2)
27-49 (1998).
[28] K.W. Shotts, The Effect of Majority-Minority Mandates on Partisan Gerryman-
dering. American Journal of Political Science 45(1) 120-135 (2001).
[29] K.W. Shotts, Gerrymandering, Legislative Composition and National Policy Out-
comes. American Journal of Political Science 46(2) 398-414 (2002).
[30] W. Vickrey, On the Prevention of Gerrymandering. Political Science Quarterly
76(1) 105-110 (1961).
9
